Introduction
Ever since Quine introduced his new set theory, New Foundations (NF), in the thirties, it has been unknown whether it is consistent relative to ZF. Efforts to find a model for it in ZF have been unsuccessful. In this article I will show that a model for NF can be constructed by utilizing ideas used in systems of revision theory 1 . Revision theory is based on ideas used in the theory of truth by Saul Kripke [11] , Hans Herzberger [8] and Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap [5, 6] , but it has also been used in Raymond Turner's theory of properties.
NF has often been said to lack intuitive motivation. Revision theoretical semantics, however, is found intuitively satisfactory by many people, though it is far from uncontroversial. By showing that the axioms of NF are valid in a natural revision theoretic development of the semantics of the theory of sets I hope that I may show that a large bit of what intuitive motivation revision semantics has also attaches to NF. Of course, the collaboration between the two approaches can also reciprocally confirm revision semantics, since it shows that it can be expanded towards a wholly general solution to all or at least most of the famous paradoxes, whether set-theoretical or semantical or modal.
I will first describe NF and related set theories in section 2, then in section 3 I will describe revision theories of concepts, especially Turner's theory of properties and explain what modifications into Turner's model for his theory of properties will convert it into a model for NF.
It turns out that there is a general procedure for converting a theory of properties to a set theory. However, the set theory resulting from Turner's theory by this procedure is not yet strong enough so that its models would have to be models of NF, so far more will have to be done than just reformulating Turner's theory in set-theoretical terms.
In section 4 I will finally construct the model for NF. An impatient reader who is already familiar with NF and revision theories may skip directly to that section. Next in section 5 I will prove in some detail that the axioms of NF are true in the resulting model. In the last section I will consider briefly the question of how my model for NF might be converted into models of other NF-style set theories and higher order logics.
NF and related set theories
New Foundations (NF) is a strongly generalized and simplified version of the simple theory of types. NF was developed in [12] . After developing NF, Quine developed in [13] a stronger set theory based on it he called ML (Mathematical Logic) . Jensen developed in [10] a weakened version of NF he called NFU (New Foundations with Urelemente). Randall Holmes has produced a textbook of set theory based on NFU in [9] .
In NF the axiom schema of separation used in ZF is replaced by a stratified axiom schema of comprehension. A formula f i of set theory is stratified iff there is such a function h from the formulas of set theory to natural numbers that for all subformulas f j that occur in f i , if f j is of the form x n ∈ x m , then h(x m ) = h(x n ) + 1 and if f j is of the form x n = x m , then h(x n ) = h(x m ). A function h that fulfills this condition can be called the stratification assignment for the formula f i . According to NF, the axiom schema of comprehension Axiom 1 holds for all stratified formulas. NF in a pure form consists (besides ordinary axioms of propositional and predicate logic) of the stratified axiom schema of comprehension [12, page 92] and the axiom of extensionality 2 [12, page 89] .
Axiom 1 (R3') If φ is stratified and does not contain 'x', then (∃x)(y)(y ∈ x ≡ φ) is a theorem.
Axiom 2 (P1) ((x ⊂ y) ⊃ (y ⊂ x) ⊃ (x = y)
NFU is otherwise like NF, but the axiom of extensionality is qualified to so that it is asserted to hold only of things that have elements (i. e. are sets). Thus Jensen uses the set abstraction schema 3 (in which A is stratified) that is just Quine's Axiom 1 in Jensen's notation and the Axiom 4. Though NFU as originally defined consists of these two axioms alone, the word "NFU" is usually used in later literature to refer the combination of these two axioms with the Axiom of Infinity and the Axiom of Choice.
Axiom 3 (Abst) y x(x ∈ y ↔ A).
Axiom 4 (Ext') z(z ∈ x) ∧ z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y). → x ≡ y.
Cantor's theorem does not hold unrestrictedly in these theories. In NF, NFU, ML and MLU there are non-Cantorian sets which are bigger than or equal to their power-sets. Sets for which Cantor's theorem does hold are called Cantorian. Sets x for which the function {< y, {y} >: y ∈ x} exists are called strongly Cantorian.
The definition of natural numbers and all ordinals and cardinals in NF is very different from that used in ZF and far more natural. Every natural number is actually identical with the sets of all sets with that number of elements -thus for example the number two is identified with the set of all sets that have exactly two elements.
ML is related to NF as MKM (Mostowski-Kelley-Morse set theory) is related to ZF. A division is made in it between sets and ultimate classes. According to it there exists a class of all sets satisfying any formula, but most of such classes cannot themselves be elements of any class. However, there also exists a set of all sets satisfying a stratified formula in which only set are quantified over or referred to by the free variables. Quine mentions also [14, page 320] the possibility of MLU, a variant of ML in which the axiom of extensionality is weakened in the same way it is weakened in NFU.
3 Revision Theories and Turner's theory
Semi-inductive processes
Essential to all revision theories of any concept are what Herzberger calls semiinductive processes. Herzberger defines [8, page 68 ] the lower limit Lim(α < λ)f (α) of an ordinal sequence f (α) as {x : (∃δ < κ)(∀γ : δ ≤ γ < κ)x ∈ f (α)} and says:
By a semi-inductive process let us understand more definitely any transfinite ordinal sequence f (α) which is generated in a prescribed way from a "jump" operation J on a fixed family of sets B called the "base set". We will call f (α) semi-inductive iff for any ordinal number α and any positive limit ordinal λ:
Herzberger does not actually call his semantics revision theoretical; this label has been given by other developers of similar ideas such as Gupta and Belnap. Other revision theorists such as Gupta and Belnap have also proposed many variant versions of the limit rule. However, I will ignore these complications here. Gupta and Belnap think that revision semantics proves that there is nothing wrong with circular concepts; this interpretation of the significance of revision semantics need not be accepted by all semanticists who use semiinductive procedures.
Most revision theories have been proposed for semantic concepts such as truth and reference in attempts to cope with the liar paradox. In such theories the set f (α) mentioned in Herzberger's abstract characterization is the extension of the truth predicate or the reference predicate. There have also been attempts to use revision semantics in the theory of belief and other propositional attitudes to illuminate analogous paradoxes rising there (Se for example [1] , where the set f (α) is the set of propositions believed by a certain person). However, revision semantics have been used less often in attempts to solve Russell's paradox, whether the set-theoretic or the property-theoretic version of the paradox. Indeed, Belnap and Gupta have give reasons for doubting that revision semantics can be applied to sets if they are construed realistically.
Gupta and Belnap examine [6, page 268 ] the question whether revision semantics might be extended to a theory of classes and membership; they see that the extensionality of classes causes difficulties. They come to the conclusion that these difficulties are indicative of a problem not in their general viewpoint but in the conception they are trying to capture. According to them classes are governed by two principles, abstraction and extensiveness, that are in conflict. Gupta and Belnap suggest one way of resolving the problem might be to treat classes as fictions. I will try to show in this article that the difficulties need not indicate any problem in the conception of classes since they can be overcome (without treating classes as fictions). However, it will turn out that extensionality can be imposed on a revision semantics of classes only rather artificially, so this may perhaps be used to argue that though the notion of classes is quite coherent, the intensional notion of property is still more fundamental than the extensional notion of class.
Raymond Turner, however, has used Herzberger's semantics in developing a theory of properties.
Turner's theory of properties
In Turner's theory the set f (α) (which Turner symbolizes with P ) is interpreted as the predication relation. Turner speaks of the members of this relation as classes interchangeably with properties, and the set P can clearly also be interpreted as the elementhood relation.
Turner builds the language L of the theory of properties on an underlying first-order language L 0 which contains a symbol for zero and a pairing operator (in terms of which successor, predecessor and projection operators are defined). L contains besides them and the ordinary logical apparatus a family of relation symbols p k expressing predication (we may call them predication predicates) and there are abstracts of the formx 1 . . .x n [A] such that if t o , . . . , t k are terms then p k (t 0 , . . . , t k ) is a wff and if A is a wff thenx 1 . . .x n [A] is a term.
In his semantics Turner starts from a model of the form M, P , where M is a nonempty set and P is a binary relation on M (the predication relation). Turner supposes that M has elements corresponding to all the natural numbers. Turner interprets the abstractx 1 . . .x n [A] so that if r A is the Gödel-number of A and y 1 , . . . y n are the denotations of the closed terms occurring inx 1 . . .x n [A] then r A , y 1 , . . . , y n is the denotation ofx 1 . . .x n [A]. The use of Gödel-numbers or something similar to represent expression is necessary if we are to use strict ZF. However, if we allowed the presence of Urelements (which is known not to alter the consistency) we could treat linguistic expressions as Urelements and say that the abstracts themselves are included in M . I shall mostly ignore this difference in the sequel. The sentence p k (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k ) is true in the original model iff t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k ∈ P .
Given a model of the form M, P , Turner constructs a new model J(M ) = M, J(P ) . In this new model (I will express this a bit more simply than Turner himself does)
is true in the original model. After this Turner forms a second revision, J(J(M )), and so on. At the limit stages Turner uses Herzberger's limit rule as explained above. If λ is a limit ordinal then e, d ∈ P λ iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β < λ e, d ∈ P β .
In the revision process of the extension of the predicates p k many pairs of elements of M stabilize, i. e. after some ordinal one is always predicated of the other or never predicated of it. Others oscillate forever. However, there is an ordinal at which the truth-value of every pair of elements that stabilizes at all has stabilized. Turner calls it the stabilization ordinal. Turner defines his final model as the model corresponding to the stabilization ordinal.
From a Theory of Properties to a Set Theory
It is well known that translation functions can be defined between the syntax of set theory and the syntax of higher order logic. The same holds of the syntax of set theory and the syntax of theories of properties. It is easy to see that Turner's syntax can be brought closer to that of NF by replacing the predication predicate with ∈ and doing a few more modifications. We can define a translation function, an injection tr between the formulas of Turner's language and the formulas of NF.
If we translated Turner's syntax in this way into NF and NFU, we could also define the conception of a stratified formula in Turner's language 2 . If we restricted the terms of Turner's language to those that are stratified, and let the revision process run its course then, we might already get from Turner's model for his theory of properties a model for a set theory in which the stratified axiom schema of comprehension would be true. However, obviously the axiom of extensionality could not hold in a model constructed in this way, nor even the qualified version of the axiom of extensionality that holds in NFU. Indeed, since Turner was primarily trying to construct a theory of properties, this is quite in accordance with his aims. However, the question naturally arises whether Turner's model can be altered so that the axiom of extensionality would also be true in it.
A second small modification in the basis of Turner's construction will alter the model so that it is also a model of NF. First of all we have to change the initial extension of the predication/elementhood relation into the empty set instead of allowing it to be an arbitrary relation. Secondly, we must use equivalence classes of (closed) set abstracts instead of the abstracts (or ordered sequences of numbers corresponding to the abstracts) themselves as the elements of the domain of the final model. We can let the revision process run its course first and then form the equivalence classes on the basis of the result. Two abstracts can be included in the same equivalence class only if every third abstract that is always included in the extension of the first abstract after some stage is also always included in the extension of the second after some stage.
A Model for NF

Two languages
I will use two object languages. L 1 will be the language of ordinary set theories, including ZF and NF. L 2 will be a slightly modified form of this language. Besides these two languages there is of course the metalanguage, which is as is usual English enriched with some of the expressions of set theory. In order to differentiate the metalanguage and L 2 as an object language I will use x, y, z, . . . as the variables of the metalanguage and x 1 , x 2 , . . . as the variables of the object languages. I will not use quotation marks or concatenation operators, but will let the expressions of the object languages name themselves and indicate concatenation simply by concatenation. I hope this will not cause confusion; the article would certainly become harder to read if peppered with quotation marks and concatenation operators. I will take as primitive propositional connectives of L 2 two connectives as is usually done, in this case negation and conjunction instead of doing just with one connective, the stroke, as Quine did in his original formulation of NF. L 2 will include set-abstracts formed out of stratified formulas as its primitives. Whether L 1 includes such or not does not matter. The most strange feature about L 2 will be that the identity predicate will be allowed to occur in only very few kinds of formulas. The basic expressions of both L 1 and L 2 will be a denumerable set of variables x n for all natural numbers n and the elementhood predicate ∈ and the identity predicate. Let V ar be the set of variables of L 2 . Let T rm 2 be the set of terms of L 2 . Let Cl be the set of closed terms of L 2 (i. e. those terms of L 2 that contain no occurrence of a free variable). I will define L 2 so that the only terms are variables and closed terms.
I will state in detail the formation rules of L 2 so as to avoid all misunderstanding.
Formation Rule 2 If t i ∈ T rm 2 and t j ∈ T rm 2 then t i ∈ t j is a wff (wellformed formula) of L 2 .
If we used quotation marks and and a concatenation operator ∩ , a more exact formulation would be: if t i ∈ T rm 2 and t j ∈ T rm 2 then t
Let us repeat the definition of stratified formulas.
Formation Rule 7 A formula f i of L 2 is stratified iff there is such a function h from the variables of L 2 to natural numbers that for all subformulas f j that occur in f i , if f j is of the form x n ∈ x m , where x n and x m are variables of L 2 then h(x m ) = h(x n ) + 1 and if f j is of the form x n = x m where x n and x m are variables of L 2 , then h(
It must be noted that the stratification assignments need not take any note of closed terms; such terms as {x n : ¬{x m : x m = x m } ∈ {x m : x m = x m }} pose no danger of paradox, but this term for example denotes quite unambiguously the empty set.
Free and bound occurrences of variables are defined in the usual way 3 .
Formation Rule 8 If f is a stratified wff of L 2 and x n is the only variable of L 2 occurring free in f then {x n : f } ∈ Cl.
Formation Rule 9 If x ∈ Cl then x ∈ T rm 2 .
Formation Rule 10 Nothing is a formula or closed term or term of L 2 unless it follows from the preceding rules that it is a formula or closed term or term.
The formation rules of L 1 are otherwise identical to those of L 2 except that Formation Rule 3 is modified so that identity formulas can be formed in the usual way -if t 1 and t 2 are any terms of L 1 then t 1 = t 2 is a formula of L 1 -and Formation Rule 8 can be left out or retained as the reader wishes.
A Sequence of Models of Property Theory
The basic idea in our construction of models is to construct a sequence of models for property theory which is isomorphic to the sequence of ordinals in which more and more instances of the stratified axiom schema of comprehension are validated until finally all instances of the schema are validated. These models will all be intensional so that the axiom of extensionality is true in none of them and therefore I will call them models of property theory though I will use set-theoretical notation in the language they interpret. The process of revision of models has a fixed point and so we get a final model for property theory. After this I will form equivalence classes from the elements of the domain of the final model that are coextensive in that model so that we get a model for NF in which the axiom of extensionality does hold. I will call models corresponding to successor ordinals successor models and models corresponding to limit ordinals limit models.
Metadefinition 1 D α = D = Cl for all ordinals α and all types i.
We can now give the interpretations of expressions of L 2 in models M α . The interpretation of set abstracts in L 2 is different from what one might except: closed set abstracts are interpreted as referring to themselves. Thus if f is stratified formula of L 2 s. t. x n is the only variable occurring free in it, then I α ({x n : f }) = {x n : f }.
Semantic Rule 2 I 0 (∈) = ∅.
The following semantic rule is the most crucial of all the rules governing the interpretation of expressions in models M α , since it determines the transition from lower, less perfect models to higher, more perfect ones. Let f (x/x n ) be the formula of L 2 that is otherwise identical with f but in which the closed term x has been substituted for every free occurrence of the variable x n .
Semantic Rule 3 x, {x n : F } ∈ I α+1 (∈) iff {x n : F } ∈ Cl and I α (F (x/x n )) = T .
If we used quotation marks and and concatenation operators
∩ , a more exact formulation would be x,
The reader will certainly see why I decided to dispense with this added rigor! Semantic Rule 4 If λ is a limit ordinal, then x, y ∈ I λ (∈) iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β < λ x, y ∈ I β (∈).
It is easy to see that we have here an example of a semi-inductive process in Herzberger's sense: let us define B and f and the jump operation J so that B = ℘(Cl × Cl), f (α) = I α (∈) and f (α + 1) = J(f (α)). We could also just as well define them so that
Semantic Rule 7 x, y ∈ I α (=) iff x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl and x = y.
Since the models M α are term models quantification can be understood to be substitutional as well as objectual. I must hasten to assure the reader that this does not mean that quantification would be substitutional in the model of NF that I will eventually construct.
We can now define an equivalence relation between the members of Cl = D α .
Metadefinition 3 x ∼ α y iff x ⊆ Cl and y ⊆ Cl and for all z ∈ Cl z,
This equivalence relation is used to define equivalence classes of the members of D α .
A few examples of the process of revision may be useful. In the first model M 0 no term has elements -i. e. for no x, y ∈ Cl x, y ∈ I 0 (∈). In the second model for all terms x x, {x 1 : x 1 = x 1 } ∈ I 1 (∈) -which means (if the terms are interpreted as properties) that there already are universal properties having all the instances they will ever have (or if we think already about the equivalence classes of these terms that the universal set already has all the elements it will eventually have). Oddly enough, though {x 1 : x 1 = x 1 } has lots of elements in M 1 it yet is not an element of the set of non-empty sets at that stage, but if we wait for the following stage, this anomaly is corrected -{x 1 :
}} -the singleton of the universal set becomes such a singleton at this level (as does the singleton of the empty set). At stage ω all the finite constructible wellfounded sets NF has in common with ZF have received members and very many of the best-known non-Cantorian sets (including natural numbers) have also begun to receive many of their members, but the set of all infinite sets still remains empty. Only at stage ω + 1 does the set of infinite sets get members. So it goes on. However, some terms such as {x 1 : (∃x ) (x 2 ∈ x 1 ∧ ¬x 2 ∈ x 1 )}) never get any elements, while others (like {x 1 : {x 2 : x 2 = x 2 } ∈ {x 3 : (∃x 4 )(x 4 ∈ x 3 )}}) get elements for a few stages (in this case just for stages 1 and 2) but after that lose them for ever. Both of these kinds of terms eventually become constituents of the set that will represent the empty set in our model.
The Final Model of Property Theory
The revision process of the models M α , actually has a fixed point. That is to say, there is such an interpretation function I α and such a model M α that I α = I α+1 and M α = M α+1 . From this it follows by transfinite induction that there is such an interpretation function I α and such a model M α that for all such ordinals β that α ≤ β I α = I β and M α = M β which of course implies that for all pairs of terms x and y of the language of L 2 for all ordinals β s. t.
That there is a fixed point is far from trivial, since in most revision semantics no such fixed point exists. Usually we just have a stabilization ordinal in Herzberger's sense (and if that were all we had then the model could probably not be converted to a model of an extensional set theory, at least not as easily as now).
Let us say that an ordinal α is the stabilization point for a pair of terms x, y of L 2 iff for all ordinals β s. t. β ≥ α x, y ∈ I β (∈) or for no ordinals β s. t. β ≥ α x, y ∈ I β (∈).
Let us say that an ordinal σ is a stabilization ordinal iff for all terms x and y of L 2 and ordinals β s. t. β is the stabilization point for x, y σ is the stabilization point for x, y . Obviously since fixed points exist if I α is a fixed point then α is a stabilization ordinal. However,since in the process of revision of the models M α every pair of terms has a stabilization point which does not happen in most revision processes -for example it does not happen in the revision process used by Turner in his theory of properties -stabilization ordinals here clearly have a stronger property than they usually have, so it is appropriate to invent a new name for stabilization ordinals having such a stronger property. I will speak about fixation ordinals.
Metadefinition 5 An ordinal σ is a fixation ordinal of the sequence of models M α iff for all x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl for all ordinals β s. t. σ ≤ β x, y ∈ I β (∈) or for no ordinals β s. t. σ ≤ β x, y ∈ I β (∈).
We can define the concept of stability for pairs of closed terms of L 1 following Herzberger and Turner. A pair of closed terms y, x of L 1 is positively stable iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈). A pair of closed terms y, x of L 1 is negatively stable iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈) A pair of closed terms y, x is stable (st( x, y )) iff it is either positively stable or negatively stable.
Metadefinition 6 st( x, y ) iff x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl and either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈).
Since we restricted the closed terms of L 2 into closed stratified terms, we can actually prove that every pair of terms of L 2 is stable. Though the examples I gave above may already create an intution that this is so, it may be worthwhile trying to give a rigorous proof for this. Since I will make use of this theorem in proving that our model of NF really is a model of NF, it is best that I present the proof here before going on to define the equivalence classes. The reader who is just interested in seeing what the model of NF looks like may skip ahead. The proof is simple in principle but very boring.
Theorem 1 For all x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl, either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, x ∈ I β (∈).
Proof: Since for all x ∈ Cl there is a stratified wff f of L 2 with one free occurrence of a variable x n of L 2 s. t. x = {x n : f }, the proof proceeds by induction over the complexity of f . We must show that for all y ∈ Cl and all stratified wffs f 1 and f 2 with free occurrences of at most one variable x n of L 2 either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β
The basic case is that of identity formulas. Let f 1 = t i = t i (where t i maybe any closed term or a variable x n and f 2 = t j = t j . (where t j may be any closed term or a variable x m Obviously for all x ∈ Cl x = x and therefore for all ordinals α and all variables x n and x m I α (f 1 (x/x n )) = T and
. Therefore for all x ∈ Cl the very second ordinal 1 is such an ordinal α that for all ordinals β s.
Therefore by predicate logic for all x ∈ Cl either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈). Since this holds for all x ∈ Cl it clearly holds also for {x n : x n = x n } itself; i. e. the very second ordinal 1 is such an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n :
Now let us make the inductive assumption that the theorem holds for all formulas f 3 and f 4 simpler than f 1 or f 2 , that is that for all formulas f 3 and f 4 such that either f 3 is simpler than either f 1 or f 2 or f 4 is simpler than either f 1 or f 2 there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x k : f 3 }, {x l : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s.
We have to examine identity formulas again, this time in the case where f 2 is an identity formula (i. e. f 2 = x m = x m for some variable x m ) but f 1 need not be. However, since while proving that the basic case was okay we already proved that for all x ∈ Cl either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈), then clearly this holds also for {x n : f 1 }.
Let f 2 = t i ∈ t j . We have to consider three possibilities; either both t i and t j are both closed terms simpler than f 2 or t i = x m for the free variable x m and t j is a closed term simpler than f 2 ; or t j = x m for the free variable x m and t i is a closed term simpler than f 2 . Clearly these are the only possibilities. For clearly if both the terms were identical with x m the formula would no longer be stratified, and if one of them were identical with x m and the other were some other variable x k then the formula would contain two free variables 5 . In all of the three cases it follows from the inductive assumption that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β t i ({x n :
or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no
. Now it follows from semantic rule 3 that for all ordinals β t i ({x n :
Therefore there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β t i ({x n :
there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : t i ∈ t j } ∈ I β+1 (∈). On the other hand there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β t i ({x n :
iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : t i ∈ t j } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore since according to the inductive assumption there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β
we can conclude that there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : t i ∈ t j } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals
Thus we have proved that the theorem holds in the case of all atomic formulas and can move on to complex formulas.
Let f 2 = ¬f 4 . Now the inductive assumption is that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈). It follows from this that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). However, according to Semantic Rule 3 for all y ∈ Cl and for all ordinals β y, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) iff I β (f 4 (y/x m )) = T . Therefore if there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β) (f 4 (y/x m )) = T and if there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, {x l : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β (f 4 (y/x m )) = T for all y ∈ Cl. However according to Semantic Rule 8 for all ordinals β not I β (f 4 (y/x m )) = T iff I β ((¬f 4 )(y/x m )) = T . Therefore for all y ∈ Cl if there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β ((¬f 4 )(y/x m )) = T and if there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β ((¬f 4 )(y/x m )) = T . According to Semantic Rule 3 for all y ∈ Cl if I β ((¬f 4 )(y/x m )) = T then y, {x m : ¬f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore if there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : ¬f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) and if there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) then there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : ¬f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore since we assumed that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) we can deduce that there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : ¬f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : ¬f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈).
Let f 2 = f 4 ∧ f 5 . Now the inductive assumption is that the theorem holds for f 1 and all f 4 and f 5 simpler than f 2 , i. e. that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) and likewise that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈). If α is an ordinal s. t. either for all β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) and γ is the ordinal s. t. either for all β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) and δ is the bigger of the two ordinals α and γ then either for all β ≥ δ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ δ y, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I β (∈). For clearly if for no β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) then either for no β > δ not {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) or for no β > δ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 5 } ∈ I β+1 (∈ ) and therefore it follows from Semantic Rule 3 that either not I β (f 4 ({x n : f 1 }/x m )) = T or not I β (f 5 ({x n : f 1 }/x m ) = T and therefore in accordance with Semantic Rule 9 not I β ((f 4 ∧ f 5 )({x n : f 1 }/x m )) = T and therefore by Semantic Rule 3 for no β > δ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 ∧ f 5 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore if either for no β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x l : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x l : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) then for no β > δ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 1 ∧ f 2 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). We can show similarly that if both for all β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x l : f 4 } ∈ I β (∈) and for all β ≥ γ {x n : f 1 }, {x l : f 5 } ∈ I β (∈) then also for all β > δ {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 ∧ f 5 } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β {x n : f 1 }, {x n : f } ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β y, {x n : f } ∈ I β (∈).
Let f 2 = (∃x l )f 4 , Now the inductive assumption is that the theorem is true for all formulas f 4 and f 5 simpler than f 2 and terms t 1 simpler than f 2 s. t. f 5 = f 4 (t 1 /x l ). That is to say for all terms t 1 simpler than f 2 it holds that either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈). However, the set of terms simpler than f 2 is denumerable, and therefore the set of ordinals α s. t. t. for some term t 1 simpler than f 4 for all β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ α {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) must have an upper bound (actually even a supremum, but this is not needed in the proof). If δ is any such upper bound, then either for all β s. t. δ ≤ β for some term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than f 2 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) or for no β s. t. δ ≤ β for any term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than f 2 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈). If either for all β s. t. δ ≤ β for some term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than f 2 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) or for no β s. t. δ ≤ β for any term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than f 2 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β (∈) then clearly also either for all β s. t. δ ≤ β for some term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than f 2 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β+1 (∈) or for no β s. t. δ ≤ β for any term t 1 ∈ Cl simpler than {x n : f } {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β+1 (∈). However, according to semantic rule 3 for all t 1 ∈ Cl y, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β+1 (∈ ) iff I β (f 4 (t 1 /x l )({x n : f 1 }/x m )) = T . Therefore there is t 1 ∈ Cl s. t. {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 4 (t 1 /x l )} ∈ I β+1 (∈) iff there is t 1 ∈ Cl s. t. I β (f 4 (t 1 /x l )({x n : f 1 }/x m )) = T . However according to Semantic Rule 10 there is t 1 ∈ Cl s. t.
)) = T then according to semantic rule 3 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : (∃x l )f } ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore for all β ≥ δ + 1 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈) or for no β ≥ δ + 1 {x n : f 1 }, {x m : f 2 } ∈ I β (∈).
Thus we have gone through all the formulas f 1 and f 2 of L 1 and shown that the theorem holds for all terms of the form {x n : f 1 } and {x m : f 2 } . Since all x, y ∈ Cl are of these forms the theorem holds for all x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl.
Q.E.D.
This result could easily be generalized so that we could show that for all formulas f of L 1 and all g ∈ V , either there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β,g (f ) = T or there is an ordinal α s. t. for no ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β I β,g (f ) = T . From this it could then be shown by yet one more application of Semantic Rule 3 that the stratified axiom schema of comprehension holds in the model M . However, I will not use these generalized forms later, so I will not carry out the proof.
Having shown that every pair of closed terms of L 2 has a stabilization point, we can generalize this result by relying on the results of Kripke and Herzberger and show that there exists a fixed point and a stabilization ordinal for the whole revision process.
Theorem 2 There exists a fixation ordinal for the sequence of models M α .
Proof: The existence of a fixation ordinal follows from a fact to which we already had to appeal in the proof of the previous theorem. The (proper) class of ordinals is well-ordered and since the set of pairs of terms or L 2 is denumerable the (proper) class of all ordinals bigger than all the stabilization points of pairs of terms of L 2 (i. e. {α : (∀β)((∀x)(∀y)(x ∈ Cl ∧ y ∈ Cl → (∀γ)(β ≤ γ → x, y ∈ I γ (∈)) ∨ (∀γ)(β ≤ γ → ¬( x, y ∈ I γ (∈)))) → β ≤ α}) is non-empty; therefore there exists the greatest lower bound of the class of all ordinals bigger than all the stabilization points of pairs of terms of L 2 . This is also the least upper bound of the set containing all the stabilization points for all the pairs of terms of L 2 . Clearly this least upper bound is the first fixation ordinal and all ordinals greater than it are fixation ordinals.
The final model M of property theory will consists of the same domain D = Cl as all the models M α together with a new interpretation function I.
Metadefinition 7 M = D, I
Semantic Rule 11 x, y ∈ I(∈) iff there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x, y ∈ I β (∈).
Semantic Rule 12 x, y ∈ I(=) iff x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl and x = y. Semantic Rule 13 I(t i ∈ t j ) = T iff I(t i ), I(t j ) ∈ I(∈).
Semantic Rule 14 I(t i = t j ) = T iff I(t i ), I(t j ) ∈ I α (=).
Semantic Rule 15 I(¬f
) = T iff not I(f ) = T . Semantic Rule 16 I(f 1 ∧ f 2 ) = T iff I(f 1 ) = T and I g (f 2 ) = T . Semantic Rule 17 I((∃x n )f ) = T iff there is x ∈ D s. t. I(f (x/x n )) = T .
The Model of NF
We can now define the final equivalence relations and with their aid the final equivalence classes that will be the elements of the universe U of our model N of NF.
Metadefinition 8 x ∼ y iff x ⊆ Cl) and y ⊆ Cl and for all fixation ordinals σ x ∼ σ y This definition could have been expressed equivalently by saying that x ∼ y iff x ∈ ℘(Cl) and y ∈ ℘(Cl) and there is an ordinal α s. t. for all ordinals β s. t. α ≤ β x ∼ β y.
The domain of the model of NF will contain the equivalence classes of all closed stratified terms.
That the set U exists follows of course directly from the axiom schema of separation that holds in the metatheory, since its definition is of the form{x : x ∈ ℘(Cl) ∧ f } and the existence of the set of terms of L 2 has been presupposed and ℘(Cl thus exists by the power set axiom.
Let A be the set of assignments in model N , i. e. the set of all functions from the variables of L 1 to U .
The interpretation of the elementhood predicate is defined so that a member x of U is an element of another member y of U iff all closed terms of L 1 whose equivalence classes they are are in the corresponding relationship in the final model of property theory -that is to say, for all z and u s. t. x = [z] and y = [u] z, u ∈ I(∈).
Semantic Rule 18 x, y ∈ J(∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ x and all u ∈ y z, u ∈ I σ (∈).
Semantic Rule 19 x, y ∈ J(=) iff x ∈ U and y ∈ U and x = y. J g (f ) denotes the interpretation of the formula f under the assignment g ∈ A
Semantic Rule 20 For all
As usual I will signify with g(x/x n ) the assignment h ∈ A that is otherwise identical with g but which is such that h(x n ) = x.
Semantic Rule 24 For all
If set abstracts are taken as primitives, the following rule will give their interpetation.
Semantic Rule 25 For all
Thus we have constructed a model for NF. However, the reader may not yet see that it is a model of that theory, so in the next section I must give a proof of this.
The interpretation of the "weird" non-Cantorian sets in our model is ridiculously simple (but also unfortunately not very natural). The non-Cantorian sets of NF are identical with the set of set abstracts equivalent with the set abstract formed from the stratified formula expressing the condition of membership in them. Thus the universal set is interpreted as the equivalence class of all terms such as {x 1 : f i }, i.e. [{x 1 : f i }] where f i is equivalent with the formula (∀x 2 )(x 2 ∈ x 1 ≡ x 2 ∈ x 1 ). This equivalence class contains besides
It must be noted, however, that this equivalence class may, for all I can prove, also contain some terms whose equivalence with these terms cannot be proved from the axioms of NF, since the equivalence relation in question here is not that of equivalence according to the axioms of NF but is defined wholly semantically. The singleton of the universal set is interpreted as the equivalence class of all terms {x 1 : f i } where f i is equivalent with the formula (∀x 2 )(x 2 ∈ x 1 ≡ x 2 ∈ {x 4 : x 4 = x 4 }). Perhaps one more example will do; natural numbers are a very important kind of set for mathematics and the way NF interprets them is different from the usual, so I will give one example of them. The natural number two is identified with the equivalence class of all terms {x 1 : f i } where f i is equivalent with the formula (∃x 2 )(∃x 3 )(
It is perhaps superfluous to mention that the model constructed in this article is not the intended model of NF, but I will say it anyway, lest formalists be too quick to use the results of this article in their favor. The model helps us to see the consistency of NF relative to ZF, but does not tell us everything (or perhaps even very much) about the intuitive meaning of the elementhood predicate as it is used in NF. Ontologically all sets are not really classes of linguistic expressions (any more than all properties are terms) and no pure sets such as attention is restricted to in NF are such classes. Nevertheless, the model may help to illuminate in some slight degree the structure of the real hierarchy of sets out there in the world. Properties are not linguistic expressions, but they must be in some way analogous to them -indeed, this is why language is capable of representing them. Thus if sets are somehow ontically reducible to properties, then sets can be quite well represented by classes of expressions 6 .
Verifying the Axioms
I will now prove that the axiom schemas of NF are true in our model. Clearly the semantics for logical constants are standard so that all the theorems of classical propositional and predicate logic are true in the models. The elementhood predicate is the only constant of our language whose interpretation is not standard, and it is well known that there can be no model of NF in which its interpretation would be standard. This might seem to be not worth mentioning; however, the semantics for logical constants 7 are not standard in most versions of revision semantics, though they were standard in Turner's theory. We might indeed build a model for NF more simply and even more naturally if we allowed the semantics to be non-standard; this would not mean that the logic would be nonstandard. However, such "models" might not be accepted as models by all logicians, so they might not resolve the question of the consistency of NF adequately.
Before proving that the properly set-theoretical axioms are true in the models we must prove a few preliminary theorems. We can prove first that when testing for membership in an equivalence class [y] y can serve as the representative of all the elements of [y] (as is usual in the case of equivalence classes).
Theorem 3 x, [y] ∈ J(∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ x z, y ∈ I σ (∈).
Proof: According to semantic rule 18 x, [y] ∈ J(∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ x and u ∈ [y] z, u ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore the implication from left to right follows trivially from the definition of J(∈) by universal instantiation. Therefore we need only prove that if for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ x z, y ∈ I σ (∈) then x, [y] ∈ J(∈). Let us assume that for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ x z, y ∈ I σ (∈). According to the definition of [y] for all u ∈ Cl u ∈ [y] iff u ∼ y and according to the definition of ∼ y ∼ u iff for all fixation ordinals σ y ∼ σ u. According to the definition of ∼ σ y ∼ σ u iff for all z ∈ D σ,i z, u ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, y ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore for all u ∈ Cl u ∈ [y] iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ D β,i z, u ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, y ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore since we assumed that for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ [x] z, y ∈ I σ (∈) then for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ [x] and for all u ∈ [y] z, y ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore we can conclude by using again the definition of
Proving an analogous theorem in the other (so to say upward) direction is a bit more laborious. We need to use an induction over the formulas of L 2 very similar to the induction by which the truth of Theorem 2 was proved, so I will only sketch the proof in some places.
Theorem 4
For all x and y ∈ Cl it holds for all z ∈ [x] that for all fixation ordinals σ x, y ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, y ∈ I σ (∈).
Proof: Since for all y ∈ Cl there is a stratified wff f of L 2 with one free occurrence of a variable x n of L 2 s. t. y = {x n : f }, the proof proceeds by induction over the complexity of f . We must show that for all y ∈ Cl and for all z ∈ [x] and all stratified wffs f with free occurrences of at most one variable x n of L 2 for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f } ∈ I β (∈) iff z, {x n : f } ∈ I β (∈).
The basic case is that of identity formulas. Let f = t i = t i . Obviously for all x ∈ Cl x = x and therefore for all ordinals α I α (f (x/x n )) = T and therefore also for all fixation ordinals σ I σ (f (x/x n )) = T However, according to semantic rule 3 I σ,g(x/xn) (f ) = T iff x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). Therefore for all fixation ordinals σ I σ (f (x/x n )) = T iff x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). However if x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈) then by the definition of fixation ordinals also x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ (∈). Naturally therefore also for all fixation ordinals σ I σ (f (x/x n )) = T and therefore for all fixation ordinals σ for all z ∈ [x] for all x ∈ Cl z, {x n : f } ∈ I σ (∈). Thus the equivalence is trivially true since both the antecedent and consequent are trivially true whatever element of Cl x might be 8 . Now let us make the inductive assumption that the theorem holds for all formulas f 1 simpler than f , that is that for all x ∈ Cl and z ∈ [x] it holds that for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈).
Let f = t 1 ∈ t 2 . Now we have to consider three cases: either x n = t 1 or x n = t 2 or x n does not occur free in the formula. The last case is trivial; it follows directly from Theorem 1 that in that case either both sides of the implication are true or neither is, therefore it is enough to consider the first two cases.
Let f = x n ∈ t 2 . Now clearly t 2 = {x m : f 1 } for some stratified formula f 1 simpler than f with free occurrences of at most one free variable x m , for if t 2 were identical with the variable x n the formula f would not be stratified and if it were identical with some other variable then f would contain free occurrences of more than one variable. Now it follows from semantic rule 3 that for all ordinals β and all x ∈ Cl x, {x m : f 1 } ∈ I β (∈) iff x, {x n : x n ∈ {x m : f 1 }} ∈ I β+1 (∈). Therefore for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x m :
Similarly for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ z, {x m : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). On the other hand for all x ∈ Cl for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x m : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) iff x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). and similarly for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ z, {x m :
Let f = t 1 ∈ x n . Now it follows from Theorem 3 and the definition of J(∈) that for all fixation ordinals σ {x m : f 1 }, x ∈ I σ (∈) iff for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ {x m : f 1 }, z ∈ I σ (∈). Now it follows from Semantic Rule 3 that for all ordinals β {x m : f 1 }, x ∈ I σ (∈) iff x, {x n : x n ∈ {x m : f 1 }} ∈ I σ+1 (∈). Therefore for all fixation ordinals σ {x m : f 1 }, x ∈ I σ (∈) iff x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). On the other hand for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ {x m : f 1 }, z ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈) Therefore since for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x m : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x m : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) we can conclude that for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f } ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f } ∈ I σ (∈).
Let f = ¬f 1 . Now the inductive assumption is that the theorem holds for all x ∈ Cl and for f 1 , i. e. that for all x ∈ Cl and z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I β (∈). It follows from this by the definition of fixation ordinals that for all z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I σ+1 (∈) iff z, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). However, according to semantic rule 3 for all ordinals β x, {x n : f 1 } ∈ I β+1 (∈) for all x ∈ Cl and for all formulas f 3 simpler than f and terms t 1 simpler than {x n : f } s. t. f 3 = f 2 (t 1 /x m ). For all x ∈ Cl and all z ∈ [x] for all fixed points σ and for all t 1 x, {x n : f 2 (t 1 /x m )} ∈ I σ (∈) iff z, {x n : f 2 (t 1 /x m )} ∈ I σ (∈) and for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n : f 2 (t 1 /x m )} ∈ I σ+1 (∈) iff z, {x n : f 2 (t 1 /x m )} ∈ I σ+1 (∈). However, according to Semantic Rule 3 for all t 1 x, {x n : f 2 (t 1 /x m )} ∈ I σ+1 (∈) iff I σ (f 2 (t 1 /x m )(x/x n )) = T . We can deduce from this by predicate logic that for all x ∈ Cl x, {x n :
However, according to Semantic Rule 10 there is t ∈ Cl s. t.
T then according to Semantic Rule 3 x, {x n : (∃x m )f 2 } ∈ I σ+1 (∈) and similarly if I β ((∃x m )f 2 )(x/x n )) = T then according to Semantic Rule 3 z, {x n : (∃x m )f 2 } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). Therefore for all x ∈ Cl and z ∈ [x] for all fixation ordinals σ x, {x n :
Thus we have gone through all the formulas f of L 1 and shown that the theorem holds for all terms of the form {x n : f } and for all x ∈ Cl. Since every y ∈ Cl is of this form the theorem holds for all x ∈ Cl and y ∈ Cl. Q.E.D.
Proof: According to the semantic rules governing quantification and logical connectives J g ((∀x n )(∀x m )(x n = x m ≡ ((∀x k )(x k ∈ x n ≡ x k ∈ x m ))) = T iff for all x ∈ U and y ∈ U x = y iff for all z ∈ U z, x ∈ J(∈) iff z, y ∈ J(∈).
That this condition is fulfilled can be shown to follow from the definition of U .
The proof from left to right is of course trivial. Let us suppose that x = y and let z be an arbitrary element of U s. t. z, x ∈ J(∈). Because the logic of the metatheory is extensional identicals may be substituted for each other everywhere and therefore also z, y ∈ J(∈ I). Since z was an arbitrary member of U it follows that for all z ∈ U z, x ∈ J(∈) iff z, y ∈ J(∈).
Let us on the other hand suppose that x ∈ U i+1 and y ∈ U i+1 and for all z ∈ U z, x ∈ J(∈) iff z, y ∈ J(∈ I). Let v be an arbitrary member of Cl. Clearly for all v ∈ Cl [v] ∈ U . By the definition of U i+1 and U there are terms u 1 ∈ Cl and u 2 ∈ Cl s. t. x = [u 1 ] and y = [u 2 ]. By the semantic rule giving the interpretation of the membership predicate [v], x ∈ J(∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all v ∈ [v] and all u 1 ∈ x v, u 1 ∈ I σ (∈). However, according to Theorem 3 for all fixation ordinals σ for all v 2 ∈ [v] and all u 1 ∈ x v 2 , u 1 ∈ I σ (∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all v 2 ∈ [v] v 2 , u 1 ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore [v], x ∈ J(∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all v 2 ∈ [v] v 2 , u 1 ∈ I σ (∈). However, according to Theorem 4 for all v ∈ Cl for all v 2 ∈ [v] for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I σ (∈) iff v 2 , u 1 ∈ I σ (∈). It follows from this by predicate logic that for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I σ (∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ for all v 2 ∈ [v] v 2 , u 1 ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore for all fixation ordinals σ [v], x ∈ J(∈) only if for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I β (∈) Similarly
[v], y ∈ J(∈) only if for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 2 ∈ I β (∈). Now by the assumption for all z ∈ U z, x ∈ J(∈) iff z, y ∈ J(∈ I) and therefore since
. Therefore for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I β (∈) iff for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 2 ∈ I σ (∈). However, we can easily conclude from the definition of fixation ordinals 9 that either for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I σ (∈) or for all fixation ordinals σ not v, u 1 ∈ I σ (∈) and that either for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 2 ∈ I σ (∈) or for all fixation ordinals σ not v, u 2 ∈ I σ (∈). Therefore we can conclude by predicate logic that for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I β (∈) iff v, u 2 ∈ I σ (∈). Since v was an arbitrary member of Cl we can conclude by predicate logic that for all v ∈ Cl for all fixation ordinals σ v, u 1 ∈ I β (∈) iff v, u 2 ∈ I β (∈). Proving that the axiom of comprehension holds in our model is the most laborious part of the proof of soundness.
Before proving the truth of the axiom of comprehension I must define a few auxiliary concepts.
We can define a correlation between on the one side the formulas of L 1 and the assignments belonging to A and sets of variables of L 1 and on the other side sets of equivalent terms and formulas of L 2 . The function typically replaces every free variable of L 1 with some closed term of L 2 belonging to its value except for the variables belonging to the set of variables that is its third argument, which are replaced by the corresponding free variables of L 2 .The correlation function is in way a translation from expressions of L 1 to those of L 2 , but such a translation as does not give a single translation but a number of equally good alternatives. Identity formulas are an exception, however, since they are not translated into identity formulas (since most of them do not occur in L 2 !) but into formulas stating the coextensiveness of two terms.
It is easy to see that if F is a formula of L 1 and g ∈ A and y is a set of variables of L 1 then for all f ∈ corr(g, F, y) f is stratified and therefore {x n : f } ∈ Cl and therefore [{x n : f }] exists also. Replacing variables with closed terms in a stratified formula cannot turn it into a formula that would not be stratified! It would now be easy to prove by induction over the complexity of formulas that J g (F ) = T iff for all f ∈ corr(g, F, ∅) and all fixation ordinals σ I σ (f ) = T . I leave the carrying out of the induction to the reader. A still more pertinent observation is that if f 1 ∈ corr(g, F, {x i n }) and f 2 ∈ corr(g, F, {x n }) then {x n :
After all this preliminary work has been done we can at last prove the validity of the axiom of comprehension. The proof is pretty straightforward though tedious in the extreme. The proof proceeds by an induction over the complexity of formulas of L 1 that is again very much analogous to the induction over the complexity of formulas of L 2 we performed in showing that every term of L 2 was stable.
Proof: According to the semantic rules governing quantification and logical connectives J g ((∃x n )(∀x m )(x m ∈ x n ≡ F )) = T iff there is a set x ∈ U s. t. for all y ∈ U y, x ∈ J(∈) iff J g(y/xm) (F ) = T .
We show by induction over the complexity of the formulas F that for all formulas F the equivalence class of all abstracts {x m : f } s. t. f ∈ corr(g, F, {x m }) ation ordinals σ for all u ∈ y u, {x m : f } ∈ I σ (∈). It follows from this by the definition of fixation ordinals that for all fixation ordinals σ for all u ∈ y u, {x m : f } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). It follows from this by Semantic Rule 3 that for all fixation ordinals σ for all u ∈ y I σ (f 2 )) = T where f 2 ∈ corr(g(y/x m )(z/x n ), F 1 , ∅) It follows from this by the rule giving the interpretation of the quantified sentences in models of L 2 that for all fixation ordinals σ there is y ∈ U s. t. for all u ∈ y I σ (f 2 (u/(x n )) = T . It follows from this by Semantic Rule 10 that for all fixation ordinals σ I σ (f 3 ) = T where f 3 ∈ corr(g(y/x m ), (∃x n )F, {x m }). It follows from this by Semantic Rule 3 that for all fixation ordinals σ for all u ∈ y u, {x m : f 3 } ∈ I σ+1 (∈). It follows from this by the definition of fixation ordinals that for all fixation ordinals σ for all u ∈ y u, {x m : f 3 } ∈ I σ (∈). It follows from this by Theorem 3 that y, [{x m : f 3 }] ∈ J(∈). The implication in the other direction is proved by going through the exact same steps in reverse.
Thus we have gone through all the formulas of the language of NF and shown that the theorem holds for all of them. Therefore the axiom schema is true for all formulas of L 1 . Q.E.D.
Thus we have shown that our model is indeed a model of NF.
Concluding Remarks: Modifying the Model
The model of NF I have constructed is a relatively minimal model. Very few of the axioms that people have proposed could profitably be added to NF are true in it. Therefore many questions rise concerning whether and how the model can be modified so that additional axioms would be true in it. There are also many set theories related to NF but incompatible with it some of which I reviewed in section 2. We must also ask about them whether our model can be modified so that it becomes a model for them. I will here offer a few preliminary suggestions concerning these questions.
In his original presentation of NF Quine assumed that there were entities whose only elements were themselves. Such individuals have since then become known as Quine atoms. Dana Scott [15] has shown that the existence of Quine atoms is independent of the axioms of NF. In the model of this article it is not true that there are Quine atoms. However, we can easily extend our model so that Quine atoms exist according to it. We must just add some arbitrary set QA whose intersection with Cl and the power set of Cl is empty into the domain of each model of L 2 and add to the interpretation of the elementhood predicate in models M α that if x ∈ QA then for all y ∈ D α y, x ∈ I α (∈) iff y = x. If we then carry out the construction of the model N as before, then the singletons of members of QA will represent the Quine atoms.
The Axiom of Counting is not true in our model. However, having this axiom is essential to most serious applications of NF, so it is vital to ask how we could alter the model so that it would be true. The simplest way seems to be to add infinitary conjunctions to L 2 . If we allowed a conjunction to be formed out of a denumerable set of formulas of L 2 and stipulated that it would be true in a model M α iff all of its elements were true and then let the revision process run its course, we would get a model U in which the Axiom of Counting were true 10 . Indeed, if we allow a conjunction to be formed out of any set of formulas of L 2 whose cardinality is at most α (where α is, naturally, a cardinal existing in ZF) and then give the truth-conditions in the natural way, we get a model in which it was true that any set whose cardinality was at most α is strongly Cantorian and that the cardinal α was nonempty and smaller than the cardinality of the universe. In this way we can expand the size of our model both internally and externally as much as we want 11 . Our construction of a model of NF can be easily converted into a construction of a model of NFU that is not a model of NF by simply adding some arbitrary set U r whose intersection with Cl and the power set of Cl is empty and whose cardinality is at least two to the universe of each model of L 2 D α besides the members of Cl and adding to the semantic rule giving the interpretation of the elementhood predicate that if x ∈ U r then for no ordinal α and no y ∈ D α y, x ∈ I α (∈).
Is there a way to convert our model to a model of ML? The following should do the trick though I have as yet no rigorous proof of it: We must modify the formation rules of L 2 so that we allow the formation of closed terms also out of non-stratified formulas. After this we must define the domain of U as the union of two sets of equivalence classes of closed terms of L 1 , a set U 1 containing the equivalence classes of all closed terms and a set U 2 containing the equivalence classes of closed stratified terms. Obviously proper classes are interpreted as elements of D 1 and sets as elements of D 2 . The definition of the interpretation of the elementhood predicate is otherwise the same as in the model of NF except that we require that if x, y ∈ J(∈) then x ∈ U 2 and y ∈ U 1 . Nino B. Cocchiarella (See [3] and [4] ) has developed a higher order logic HST* (and many extensions of it), in which the paradoxes can be solved in a way similar to the way they are solved in NFU or MLU. The semantics developed in this article can easily be modified so as to yield a semantics for HST*. Indeed, we can just take our final model and translate the first order set-theoretical language L 2 to the language of second-order logic with nominalized predicates 10 If x is any member of U such that it is true in the modified model U that it is denumerable, we could take such a set of formulas y that for every term z such that [z], x ∈ J(∈) the formula xn ∈ z ∧ x n+1 ∈ {xm : (∀x m+1 )(x m+1 ∈ xm ≡ x m+1 ∈ z)}) would be an element of y. If f were the infinitary conjunction formed from this set y then the equivalence class [{ xn, x n+1 : f }] (where the ordered pair xn, x n+1 is defined in NF in any of the usual ways) would now represent the function from the set that x represents to the set of the singletons of its elements. However, obviously we could not get nothing to represent a function from the universal set to the set of its singletons, since the number of elements of the universal set would now be nondenumerable both externally and internally.
11 Gödel-numbers could of course no longer be used to code all formulas, but we could extend the method of Gödel-numbering so that we used ordinals to code formulas. Since the metatheory is ZF, and it is assumed in ZF that every set can be well-ordered, every set of formulas and sets of formulas can be well-ordered and therefore a bijection can be established between it and some sequence of ordinals and therefore ordinals can be used to represent formulas even in a language with infinitary conjunction.
(using for instance the translation function defined by Cocchiarella in [4, pages 170,171] ).
Though models have already been found for Cocchiarella's systems, a new model need not be utterly superfluous. In the search for a system of logic capable of representing the phenomena of nominalization in natural languages, the logical systems of Cocchiarella and those of Chierchia and Turner in for example [2] are the most prominent candidates. The systems developed by Chierchia and Turner are not unlike the system developed by Turner alone, though they are more complex. To gain their models Turner and Chierchia use Aczel's theory of Frege Structures, in which revision theoretic techniques are combined with Scott's models for the lambda-calculus. Turner and other logicians like Kamareddine have argued for the superiority of Chierchia and Turner's approach over that of Cocchiarella. However, if we can give a semantics for Cocchiarella's system by using similar revision theoretic techniques as those by which it can be given to Turner's system, then the difference between the two approaches may be smaller than at first appears.
Stratified lambda-calculus is equivalent with NF so the same semi-inductive techniques I have used here could be modified so they could be used to give a model for stratified lambda-calculus. We could also combine the type of type theory developed by Church and Montague and stratified lambda-calculus into a more complex logic that could be called polymorphic Church type theory, which would have all the advantages of Montague's IL but in which nominalization could also be represented simply, as expressions of higher types could be substituted for those of lower types while preserving well-formedness so long as the resulting formulas would remain stratified.
There is a further bigger task which the results of this article suggest. We have used techniques originally developed to solve semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox to give the semantics to one solution of Russell's paradox. This seems to open the way to investigating the interrelations between the different kinds of paradoxes and integrating more deeply the work done in axiomatic set theory and model theoretic semantics. It even suggests that suitably generalized revision theoretic techniques might be used to develop a semantic theory offering a general solution to all the famous paradoxes. This might indeed make it necessary to abandon the standard interpretation of the logical constants that was such a pleasant feature of the model of this article. However, this is still a distant goal.
